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This article focuses on whether a certain form of consent used by biobanks – open
consent – is compatible with the Proposed Data Protection Regulation. In an open
consent procedure, the biobank requests consent once from the data subject for all
future research uses of genetic material and data. However, as biobanks process
personal data, they must comply with data protection law. Data protection law is
currently undergoing reform. The Proposed Data Protection Regulation is the
culmination of this reform and, if voted into law, will constitute a new legal
framework for biobanking. The Regulation puts strict conditions on consent – in
particular relating to information which must be given to the data subject. It seems
clear that open consent cannot meet these requirements. 4 categories of information
cannot be provided with adequate specificity: purpose, recipient, possible third
country transfers, data collected. However, whilst open consent cannot meet the
formal requirements laid out by the Regulation, this is not to say that these requirements
are substantially undebateable. Two arguments could be put forward suggesting the
applicable consent requirements should be rethought. First, from policy documents
regarding the drafting process, it seems that the informational requirements in the
Regulation are so strict in order to protect the data subject from risks inherent in the use
of the consent mechanism in a certain context – exemplified by the online context.
There are substantial differences between this context and the biobanking context.
Arguably, a consent transaction in the biobanking does not present the same type of risk
to the data subject. If the risks are different, then perhaps there are also grounds for a
reconsideration of consent requirements? Second, an argument can be made that the
legislator drafted the Regulation based on certain assumptions as to the nature of ‘data’.
The authors argue that these assumptions are difficult to apply to genetic data and
accordingly a different approach to consent might be preferable. Such an approach
might be more open consent friendly.
Keywords: Genetics; Genomics; Data protection; Data protection regulation; Consent;
Open consent; BiobanksIntroduction
More and more biobanks are being set up to facilitate wide ranging, population based
genomics research. Such biobanks act as research infrastructure – collecting data and
samples from research subjects and making this material available, on application, to
researchers. The scope and accuracy of genomic research depends on the size of data2015 Hallinan and Friedewald; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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order to maximize the utility of samples and data collected in biobanks, there should
be as few limits on their use as possible. Accordingly, many large scale biobanks collect
materials prospectively – they do not state the type of research the materials will be
used for at the moment of collection.
In order to conduct medical research on competent adults, researchers have generally
been obliged to seek consent before conducting their work. Prior to biobanking, such
consent was only regarded as legitimate under certain conditions. These required the
research subject to be informed, in advance, as to the specific research which would be
conducted. Prospective collection as occurs in the biobanking context is not possible
under traditional models of consent. Accordingly, in order to bridge this impasse, alter-
native consent models were proposed for biobanking research. One such model is that
of open consent. In open consent, the participant need only engage with the biobank
once. The consent given in this engagement is valid for the extraction of the sample,
the storage of the sample and data, and all further research uses of collected materials.
As biobanks process ‘personal data’, European data protection law is applicable to
their operation. Despite the clarity that data protection law applies, there are a number
of uncertainties as to the precise application of the current piece of overarching legisla-
tion – Directive 95/46 (European Parliament & European Council 1995). Whether open
consent is legitimate is one such uncertainty.a In particular, the Directive requires that
any consent be ‘specific’ and ‘informed’. It seems that biobanks operating with open
consent cannot meet these obligations.
However, European data protection law is currently under review. This review has
resulted in a Proposed Data Protection Regulation. This Regulation will replace the
Directive and will provide a new background to the relationship between biobanks and
data protection
This article considers the status of open consent in light of the Regulation.b A num-
ber of questions arise: Must biobanks legitimate processing through consent under the
Regulation, or are there other possibilities? Which information, and of which specifi-
city, does the Regulation oblige the biobank to provide to the data subject? Can this be
provided under an open consent procedure? If open consent cannot find legitimation
under the Regulation as it is, what are its prospects moving forward?
The article can be read in 4 parts:
Part 1 describes the open consent process and the obligations laid out by the Regula-
tion relating to biobanks using open consent. It begins by explaining how open consent
works and what differentiates it from other modes of consent (section 1). It proceeds
by explaining the function of the Regulation, and by explaining its application to bio-
banks – concluding that the Regulation applies to both samples and data, and con-
tinues to apply until they are destroyed, and that biobanks can always be considered to
process sensitive personal data (section 2). When sensitive data are processed, this must
be justified under one of the grounds in Article 9. The article argues that, while there
are a number of grounds which could apply, the most relevant is consent (section 3).
The legitimation to process sensitive data following the data subject’s consent is pro-
vided by Article 9(2)(a) and can only succeed under a number of conditions – including
that consent is ‘specific and informed’. The article then proceeds to elaborate what is
meant by ‘specific and informed’ under the Regulation. It explains that certain
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4), and that this information must be of a certain specificity (section 5).
Part 2 considers whether the open consent process can fulfil the informational obliga-
tions laid out in sections 4 and 5. The article suggests that the open consent process
cannot provide the relevant specificity of information in relation to 4 categories of in-
formation; purpose of processing (section 6); recipients of processing (section 7); the
third countries to which data will be transferred (section 8); the type of data which will
be processed (section 9). With this analysis, the article concludes that, against the nor-
mal framework of informational obligations laid out be the Regulation, open consent
cannot succeed.
Part 3 then considers arguments which suggest that the normal framework provided
by the Regulation ought not apply. Such arguments suggest that, under the law in the
Regulation, open consent could still count as ‘informed and specific’ as there are me-
chanisms which allow a relaxation of the problematic consent conditions. The first
argument suggests that the expectations of the parties to the consent transaction have
a performative effect on relevant informational obligations (section 10). The second
argument suggests that, as biobanks employ other mechanisms of privacy protection –
‘buffer safeguards’ – these might provide reason for the problematic informational
obligations to be relaxed (section 11). The article finds some justification for these
arguments in the law. However, such justification is inadequate for open consent to
succeed.
Part 4 finally considers a different form of argument supporting open consent. This
form of argument suggests the logic behind the conditions laid down by the Regulation
does not apply to biobanking. Accordingly, an argument can be made that the applic-
able conditions should be reconsidered. The article begins this section with an intro-
duction to the concepts behind this form of argument – including pointing out that
the conditions of consent are not rights, but are ties to assumptions as to the substance
of regulation, the function of consent, and the actors involved (section 12). Two dif-
ferent arguments are put forward. The first argument holds that the specificity of the
informational obligations in the Regulation was set with a particular processing context
in mind. In this context there was a need to protect the data subject from particular
risks in of the consent procedure. The argument suggests that such risks are not nearly
so pronounced in the biobanking context and therefore the justification behind the
high specificity threshold is limited (section 13). The second argument observes that
the Regulation was drafted with a specific concept of ‘data’ in mind. Based on this con-
cept, the legislator has constructed a concept of consent which requires a specific de-
scription of the data which have been collected. However, genetic data is better
understood as a future source of data, than as data itself. This means that any concept
of consent which focuses on defining ‘data’ which have been collected will be of limited
applicability (section 14).
In summary, there seems no way open consent can meet the requirement under the
Regulation for consent to be ‘specific and informed’. However, there are strong argu-
ments suggesting that the Regulation’s conditions are poorly suited to the biobanking
context and to the processing of genetic data. In this regard, the authors feel there
should be a political discussion about whether to provide a specific set of consent con-
ditions for biobanking.
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The site of medical research has traditionally been the human body – whether alive or
dead. Modern medical ethics emerged with this concept of research as its template
(with the focus of ethical consideration naturally being on research done on living sub-
jects). Such research is characterized by certain features. First, it engages directly with
the research subject’s physical person. The risks associated with this form of research
are therefore predominantly physical. Second, in each instance invasive research oc-
curred, the purpose of the invasive procedure could be clarified in advance. Conditions
for a legitimate consent in medical ethics reflected these characteristics. In particular,
as part of any legitimate consent, specific information as to the nature, form and risks
of the particular proposed research had to be communicated to the participant in
advance, before any research could go ahead (Biggs 2009, pp 17–35).
Genetics, and later genomics opened up new possibilities in how to conduct research.
Importantly, genetic research can be conducted on extracted samples, rather than on
the research subject’s physical person. In essence, no human subject is required for the
act of research (although the sample must still be extracted). However, genetics and
genomics research require something else – human samples and data. The scope,
quality and effectiveness of such research is predicated on the number of samples and
quantity of data used. The more relevant genetic information (and often health and
environmental information – information relating to subject lifestyle etc.) used in any
study, the more reliable the results of that study will be.c Equally, the more data and
samples that are available for reuse, the more total studies that can be conducted and
the more studies can be verified for accuracy (Kaye 2012, pp 32–45).
Biobanks – stores of genetic material and information, which can then be used in research
projects – form a key part of the infrastructure supporting genetics and genomics research.
As the importance of samples and data has grown in research, and as genomics research at-
tempts to analyse ever expanding data sets, biobanks are becoming larger and more pro-
spective – collecting samples with no particular research purpose in mind (Expert Group on
Dealing with Ethical and Regulatory Challenges of International Biobank Research (2013)).
However, the stringent conditions of the traditional concept of consent in medical
research stand in direct contradiction to the prospective collection approach – the
requirement to specify specific research in advance standing in the way of extracting
maximum research utility from collected samples.
In response to this obstruction, arguments were put forward suggesting that biobanking
was a novel research context. Such arguments agreed that a respect for proband auto-
nomy and self-determination remained an important ethical principle in biobank research,
but suggested that the traditional concept of consent was unnecessarily restrictive. On the
one hand, it was argued that biobanking held great promise for health research and that
maintaining strict consent requirements would hinder the realisation of this promise
(Hansson et al. 2006, p 267). On the other hand, it was argued that that the form of phy-
sical risk inherent in invasive research is different to (the arguments often suggest that it
is also greater than) the informational risk present in biobanking research (Mascalzoni
et al. 2008). On the back of these arguments, a number of novel consent modes were pro-
posed as more suitable alternatives for biobanking. For example:
Democratic community consent (also known as presumed consent or opt-out), was
employed in Iceland to legitimate the collection and use of the Icelandic population’s
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every individual’s consent to the future use of their samples and materials. The individ-
ual was not specifically asked for consent at any point, but was given the option to opt
out of the projectd.
Dynamic consent imagines a ‘personalised, digital communication interface’ which
allows biobank/researchers to establish a continuous communication with research
subjects (Kaye et al. 2014, pp 1). Research subjects can be presented with specific pro-
jects and information and, in turn, continuously tailor their consent preferences ac-
cording to their desires and needse.
Sectoral consent imagines a limited extension to the boundaries of specific consent.
Whilst specific consent demands that the specifics of the project are given to the
research subject in advance, sectoral consent allows a research subject to consent to
research in a given area – for example, a data subject would be allowed to consent to
all cancer research (American Society of Human Genetics, 1996)f.
However, of all the proposed novel forms of consent, it is ‘open consent’ – also known
as ‘broad consent’, ‘general consent’ and even ‘blanket consent’ – which strays furthest
from the traditional model of specific informed consentg. Open consent has a history
stretching back over a decade (Chadwick and Berg 2001). In this time, multiple definitions
have been proposed, for example: Chadwick and Berg (2001), p 320 suggest that: ‘consent
could be introduced, such as consent to entry into a sample collection…and to further
(more general) research’. ‘Lunshof et al. (2008), p 409 suggest – in relation to the Personal
Genome Project – that ‘open consent means that volunteers consent to unrestricted
[research] re-disclosure of data originating from a confidential relationship, namely their
health records, and to unrestricted [research] disclosure of information that emerges from
any future research on their genotype-phenotype data set, the information content of
which cannot be predicted’; Nomper (2005), p 83 suggests – in relation to population bio-
banks – that: ‘Open consent is the research subject’s affirmative agreement to participate
in a population genetic database and in research projects that use tissue and data from
that database’. Whilst there are minor differences between definitions – and this suggests
the concept is still in definitional flux – there are certain core features of open consent
which are common across all definitions. These characterise the concept and to differenti-
ate it from all other forms of consent.
1. The research subject actively gives consent (unlike presumed consent) only once to
the biobank (unlike dynamic consent).
2. The research subject is not asked to give consent to a specific research project
(unlike traditional specific informed consent) or to an area of research (unlike
sectoral consent). The subject gives consent to the use of their sample and data
for all future research purposes. At the moment of collection, the research
projects – nor even research areas – in which tissue samples and data will be used,
are not precisely defined.
3. In most biobanks operating open consent, researchers wishing to conduct research
on samples will apply to the biobank for the opportunity to use stored tissue and
data.h The biobank (or more precisely, the governance systems of the biobank) will
then decide whether a research project will be permitted to use the requested
material. The research subject plays no role in this decision.
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not hard to see why. On the one hand, it allows the maximum research utility to be
extracted from each sample – the consent includes no limits to the scope of research
uses to which the sample could be put. On the other hand, the consent procedure de-
mands minimal organisational and administrative effort – one meeting with the subject,
one form signed and the consent procedure is concluded. Open consent has proven
particularly popular with population biobank projects. The donor consent form for the
Estonian Geenivaramu states in Article 10: ‘By signing this document, I give my free
and informed consent to… 4) Have the tissue sample, description of my state of health
and my genealogy entered in the Gene Bank in coded form; 5) The use thereof for gen-
etic research, public health research and statistical and other purposes in accordance
with the law’ (TÜ Eesti Geenivaramu 2007). The donor consent form for the UK bio-
bank states: ‘I give permission for long-term storage and use of my blood and urine
samples for health-related research purposes (even after my incapacity or death)’ (UK
Biobank 2013).The data protection regulation and its application to biobanking
Since 1995, the key legal instrument elaborating European data protection law has been
Directive 95/46 (European Parliament & European Council 1995). However, the role of
the Directive in the regulation of biobanks was highly uncertain. On the one hand, the
Directive was not designed with biobanks in mind, and it was therefore unclear as to
how and when its provisions should be applied. On the other hand, in the absence of
European level clarity on the application of the Directive, Member States provided local
approaches, which in turn led to a fragmentation of legal approaches across Europe
(Schulte in den Bäumen et al. 2010, pp 36).
In the 18 years since the drafting of the Directive, much has changedi. Accordingly,
in 2009 the European Commission began an investigation into the reform of data pro-
tection law. The reform process took a big step forward in January 2012, when the
Commission released a draft Data Protection Regulation proposed as a replacement to
Directive 95/46 (European Commission 2012a). This Regulation has since been debated in
the Parliament, which, earlier in 2014 approved an amended ‘Consolidated Regulation’ for
consideration before the Council (The European Parliament (2013)). The Council have
also suggested a number of further amendments to the Commission’s original version.
(The Council of the European Union (2013)). If adopted, this Regulation will become the
central instrument in European data protection law. As opposed to Directives – which
lay out principles to be transposed into Member State law – Regulations are directly
applicable as law in each Member State. The direct effect of the Regulation will mean
its provisions will replace divergent data protection law in Member States. The Regula-
tion will thus provide a new backdrop against which debates about data protection and
biobanking will take place.
The Regulation applies in a broad range of contexts. Article 2(1) of the Commission’s
versions outlines the scope of the proposed Regulation stating: ‘This Regulation applies
to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means, and to the
processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing
system or are intended to form part of a filing system’ (European Commission 2012a,
Hallinan and Friedewald Life Sciences, Society and Policy  (2015) 11:1 Page 7 of 36Article 2(1)).j The Regulation will apply to data processing conducted in relation to re-
search and therefore in the biobanking context.
However, the Regulation does not apply when ‘personal data’ are not being processed.
In this regard, there are two situations in which the scope of the concept of ‘personal
data’ in relation to biobanking has been unclear – the case of anonymous data, and the
case of the physical sample (as opposed to the extracted data). The authors would sug-
gest that the scope of the Regulation should be given a broad interpretation. They
believe that the concepts of anonymity (and pseudonymity) are not effectively applic-
able to genetic data or biobank processing. Accordingly the authors regard biobanks to
always be process personal data and believe that the provisions of the Regulation
should always apply.k They also believe that the Regulation must apply to both physical
samples, and associated data.l In summary, the authors believe that the Regulation must
apply to biobanking from the moment of collection of samples and data, and through-
out the lifetime of storage and further processing of all samples and data.
When the Regulation is found to apply rationae materiae, it must then be defined
how it applies. The Regulation operates a two tiered system of protection. This system
classifies data according to how much of an impact processing could have on the fun-
damental rights of the data subject. The first tier is for ‘normal data’. The second tier is
for ‘sensitive data’. A stricter set of conditions and a higher standard of oversight are
applied to the processing of sensitive forms of data. A list of sensitive types of data is
laid out in Article 9 of the Commission’s version (European Commission 2012a). The
categories mentioned in Article 9 of the Commission’s version include; ‘personal data,
revealing race or ethnic origin, political opinions, religion or beliefs, trade-union mem-
bership, and the processing of genetic data or data concerning health or sex life or
criminal convictions or related security measures’.m Article 4(10) of the Commission’s
version defines genetic data: “genetic data’ means all data, of whatever type, concerning
the characteristics of an individual which are inherited or acquired during early pre-
natal development’ (European Commission 2012a, Article 4(10)). Interestingly, the Par-
liament suggest an alteration to this definition: “genetic data’ means all personal data
relating to the genetic characteristics of an individual which have been inherited or ac-
quired as they result from an analysis of a biological sample from the individual in
question, in particular by chromosomal, desoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribo-
nucleic acid (RNA) analysis or analysis of any other element enabling equivalent
information to be obtained’. In turn, the Council suggest that: “genetic data’ means all
personal data relating to the genetic characteristics of an individual that have been
inherited of acquired, resulting from an analysis of a biological sample from the
individual in question’. However, the Council extend this definition in their amend-
ment to Recital 25a which states that genetic data can be obtained not only from ana-
lysis of a biological sample, but also; ‘in particular by chromosomal, deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA) analysis or analysis of any other element enab-
ling equivalent information to be obtained’.
Under the Commission’s definition, every type of data collected by a biobank might
be considered as ‘genetic’. We have already argued that the physical sample should be
considered as data, and this would accordingly be considered data which ‘concerned’
inherited characteristics – the genome would be extracted from the raw sample. Any
data which were collected through the analysis of the sample would also be data which
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other forms of data from the individual – for example health and lifestyle data. Many
phenotypes result from the interaction between the individual’s genetic architecture
and environmental factors. The biobank collects these other types of information to
study this interaction – how non-genomic factors affect gene expression. Information
collected with the intention of analysing gene expression, even if not necessarily
‘genetic’ on its own, would become information ‘concerned’ with genetics through the
context of analysis. Under this definition, all data collected by the biobank, from the
moment of collection, would be regarded as ‘genetic data’ and therefore must be treated
as ‘sensitive data’.
Under the Parliament and Council definition however, it would only certainly be the
results of the analysis of the biological sample which would certainly be defined as
‘genetic’. An argument could be made that, when other forms of data are subjected to
an analysis which aimed to reveal information about genetics, they could be conceived
of as ‘other elements’ allowing information about inherited characteristics to be ob-
tained. In this reading, such data would also, following analysis, be regarded as ‘genetic
data’. However under the Parliament and Council definitions, before such an analysis
was conducted, no collected data would be regarded as ‘genetic’. Thus the physical
sample would not be regarded as ‘genetic’, nor would any of the other information
collected.n Nevertheless, even under the Parliament and Council versions of the
Regulation, such other information could be conceived of as ‘health data’. Both versions
regard health data as any data which relates to the physical or mental health of an indi-
vidual. As biobanks are part of the health research infrastructure and all data will be
used in health research, this information can be regarded as ‘relating’ to health. Accor-
dingly such data should also be regarded as ‘sensitive’.
As data collected and processed by biobanks is classified as ‘sensitive’ under Art-
icle 9, ts processing is generally prohibited under 9(1); ‘the processing of [sensitive
data] shall be prohibited’, subject only to certain limited exceptions laid out in Art-
icle 9(2) (European Commission 2012a, Article 9(2)). Accordingly, for biobanks to
legitimately process data, they need to do so under an applicable exception under
Article 9(2).o
Consent as the relevant exception for biobanks under article 9(2)
Article 9(2) offers a number of possible exceptions. Article 9(2)(a) states that the con-
sent of the data subject allows the processing of sensitive data.p Article 9(2)(b) – (j)
list a number of other justifications. The exceptions under 9(2)(b)-(j) can be loosely
categorised as ‘public interest’ exceptions. Public interest exceptions take the decision
as to whether data should be processed away from the individual – the normative
benefit of processing has already been defined in the political process (Tene & Wolf
2013, pp 3–4). There has been considerable debate as to which form of justification
must be relied upon where more than one ground seems relevant. In the case of bio-
banking, the authors feel that there is a lexical order to legitimating conditions. In this
regard, they feel that consent under 9(2)(a) is the relevant exception that ought to be
relied upon.
In particular, there are two strong legal theoretical arguments suggesting the primacy
of consent over other possible justifications.
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goals – arguably the main goal – of the Regulation is to provide a framework to pro-
tect individuals’ rights. Sensitive data listed under Article 9 are those data whose pro-
cessing constitutes a specific risk to rights. Commentators suggest that such data are,
by nature capable of infringing on fundamental rights. Whenever they are processed,
there is thus a prima facie infringement of the rights of the data subject (Beyleveld
2004a, pp 10–11). In the European Court of Human Right’s case law, a substantial
distinction is thus made between the choices of justification when processing sen-
sitive data. In M.S. v. Sweden, the Court found that the lack of consent of the data
subject to the disclosure of certain sensitive data was a key element in the finding of
an infringement of Article 8 (the right to privacy). Accordingly, the plaintiff ’s con-
sent would have served to waive the existence of an infringement (M.S. v. Sweden,
European Court of Human Rights 1997, §34-35). Thus, if consent is relied upon
under 9(2)(a), there is no interference with the data subject’s rights. If a public inter-
est is relied upon under 9(2)(b)-(j) there is an interference, it simply has a justification
which overrides the right. In human rights law, if the same result can be achieved
with less impact on an individual’s rights, this option must be taken. Thus, in relation
to the underlying rights at stake, if consent can be obtained – which it can in
biobanking – this is the ground under 9(2) which should be relied upon (Beyleveld
2004a, pp 10–11).q
Second, in the ethical and legal tradition of biomedical research, the research sub-
ject’s consent – under normal circumstances – is a prerequisite to conducting research.
Biobanking falls definitively within the sphere of medical research. Whilst there is argu-
ment as to the form of consent necessary, there is little dispute that biobanks collecting
samples directly from research subjects should obtain consent. Theoretically, the use of
consent in medical research is a reflection of the autonomy, and primacy of decision, of
the research subject in the research process. This has a long history, emerging form
hard lessons drawn from horrific instances of paternalism and abuse in research.r Given
that the desire of the potential research subject plays the central role in contemporary
thinking about biomedical research, the use of a public interest exception under data
protection law to allow research when the data has been collected from the individual
seems awkward.s
It has been established that biobanks ought to rely on the consent of the data
subject. However, the Regulation lays out a number of further conditions defining
when a consent is legitimate under 9(2)(a). One sub-set of these conditions relates to
what the data subject must know about the proposed processing before they can be
seen to legitimately consent. Article 4(8) states ‘the data subject’s consent’ means
any…specific [and] informed…indication of his or her wishes’ (European Commission
2012a, Article 4).t
Where there is an obligation to inform, there must be a set of criteria against which
the discharge of this obligation can be measured. In this regard, Kosta states: ‘Con-
cretising these questions in the area of data protection, it is essential to examine [1]
what kind of information and [2] how much of it does the data subject need [− how
specific does information need to be]’ (Kosta 2011, p 178). Using these questions as a
baseline, it is possible to infer from the text of the Regulation, and from certain rele-
vant jurisprudence, a set criteria which constitute the nuts and bolts of this obligation.
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In relation to Kosta’s first category, the Articles in the Regulation directly elaborating
the conditions of consent do not clarify which kinds of information must be provided
to the data subject.
However, elsewhere in the Regulation, general informational obligations (relevant to all
processing situations) are elaborated. These obligations must also be met in processing
legitimated by the data subject’s consent (Beyleveld 2004b, pp 69–71). The most important
Article in this regard is Article 14. Article 14(1) elaborates a number of categories of infor-
mation which must be given, by the data controller, to the data subject, when data is col-
lected directly from the data subject – as in the case of open consent:u
14(1)(a): ‘the identity and the contact details of the controller and, if any, of the
controller’s representative and of the data protection officer’.
14(1)(b): ‘the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended’.
14(1)(c): ‘the period for which the personal data will be stored’.
14(1)(d): ‘the existence of the right to request from the controller access to and
rectification or erasure of the personal data concerning the data subject or to
object to the processing of such personal data’.
14(1)(e): ‘the right to lodge a complaint to the supervisory authority and the
contact details of the supervisory authority’.
14(1)(f ): ‘the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data’.
14(1)(g): ‘where applicable, that the controller intends to transfer to a third country or
international organisation and on the level of protection afforded by that third country or
international organisation by reference to an adequacy decision by the Commission’.
Importantly, the Parliament’s version adds to that ‘in case of transfers referred to in
Article 42, Article 43, or point (h) of Article 44(1), reference to the appropriate
safeguards and the means to obtain a copy of them’ must also be provided. The Council
version removes the necessity to provide any information as to the protection standard in
third countries.
14(1)(h): ‘any further information necessary to guarantee fair processing in respect
of the data subject, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the
personal data are collected’ (European Commission 2012a, Article 14).
The Parliament’s Consolidated version adds further categories of information to this list:
14(1)(ga): ‘where applicable, information about the existence of profiling, of measures
based on profiling, and the envisaged effects of profiling on the data subject’.
14(1)(gb): ‘meaningful information about the logic involved in any automated Processing’.
14(1)(ha): ‘where applicable, information whether personal data was provided to
public authorities during the last consecutive 12-month period’.
The Council further add:
14(1a)(b): ‘where the processing is based on point (f ) of Article 6(1) [on the grounds of
the legitimate interest of the controller], the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller’.v
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The same possibility existed in the Directive under Article 8(2)(a). Accordingly, it
is legitimate to consider European level interpretation on conditions of consent in
the Directive as having continued relevance in understanding similar conditions in
the Regulation. Of particular importance is the guidance on consent provided by the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2011). They suggest further categories of
information which must be provided. In particular, they state: ‘[consent] includes
notably which data are being processed’ (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2011,
p 17).w The Article 29 Working Party also state that consent ‘should refer clearly and pre-
cisely to the scope and consequences of processing’ (Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party 2011, p 17). The clarity of scope of processing is not a category of information itself.
It is a description for the composite of information in all other relevant categories. This is
also, to a certain extent, true for the category of ‘consequences’, although it is also possible
to consider ‘consequences’ as a separate category in its own right. Known risks or benefits
ought to be communicated to the data subject.x
How specific must information provided to the data subject be?
Defining rules, even general rules, for Kosta’s second question – how much information
does the data subject need, or how specific should it be – is much more difficult. The
Regulation itself is quiet on this point. The core problem in this regard is that specifi-
city of information can only really be measured against a type of information in a given
context. However, context cannot be the only relevant factor in the consideration of
specificity of information. This would render the provisions of the Regulation
meaningless.
In this regard, the Article 29 Working Party have attempted to provide guidance
which may be relevant across contexts.y They suggest that the specificity of information
should depend on how complex processing is. ‘The more complex data processing is,
the more can be expected from the data controller. The more difficult it becomes for
an average citizen to oversee and understand all the elements of the data processing,
the larger the efforts should become for the data controller to demonstrate that in-
formation was provided based on specific…information’ (Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party 2011, p 20).
The Article 29 Working Party does not mention the potential rights impact of pro-
cessing as relevant to the specificity of information. However, the aim of consent is to
provide legitimacy for an action which would otherwise infringe an individual’s rights.
Accordingly, Dammaan and Simitis interpret the level of specificity of information re-
quired as also being dependant on the potential impact on the rights of the data subject
(Dammann and Simitis 1997, p 115).
Defining the complexity of biobank processing is difficult. There is little jurispruden-
tial indication as to what aspects of processing need to be taken into account when
evaluating complexity. However, the authors feel that there is a strong argument to sug-
gest that biobanking processing should be regarded as comparatively complex. First,
the processing is done on a unique form of data – genetic data. Second, the framework
used to interpret this data is equally unique – comprising of a complex and esoteric
science. In this regard, studies have shown the comprehension of the public of the spe-
cificity of genetic data, and the processing of genetic data, as quite limited (Lanie et al.
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are multifaceted. In turn, there is no given limit as to how often a genetic sample/data
can be used (although limits may be implicit in the physical quantity of sample col-
lected and in how it is used) nor to how many researchers can apply to use it. Fourth,
each of these researchers may be processing the data with different goals in mind and
thus process the genetic data to reveal different types of information about the data
subject. Accordingly, there is no set limit on how much, or which type of information,
might be eventually extracted from initially collected material. Finally, there are only a
very limited number of situations in which an individual might have their genetic data
processed, and almost no situations in which the individual might have so much gen-
etic data processed. This renders the processing taking place in the biobanking context
highly unusual. Accordingly, it is unlikely that many people will have much experience,
or a solid frame of reference, through which to interpret and evaluate such processing.
Consideration of the potential impact on the data subject’s rights through processing
is a little easier. Here, there are normative reference points which clarify that the
processing of genetic data represents a high risk to the rights of the individual. The
Regulation – in Article 9 – provides normative clarification of the sensitivity of genetic
data, whilst other authoritative legal sources go one step further and suggest that gen-
etic data is data of ‘unique’ sensitivity. For example, the Article 29 consider genetic
data as exhibiting characteristics which make it particularly sensitive (Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party 2004a, pp 4–5). Equally, In the Marper case, for example,
the ECtHR specifically recognized genetic data as ‘intrinsically private’ and gave
a number of reasons for genetic data’s specific sensitivity. (S. and Marper v United
Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights 2008, § 104).
The above only provides rough guidance. It does not describe the precise level of
specificity of the information which must be given by the biobank. However, such
guidelines do provide indicators which can be considered comparatively. If it is ac-
cepted that biobank processing is both complex, and involves the processing of data of
a highly private quality, it is logical to consider that the level of specificity of informa-
tion required from the biobank ought to be comparatively high in relation to other
processing situations. Accordingly, jurisprudence relevant to processing situations
with similar, or lower, specificity thresholds can be used to provide relevant points of
comparison.
With regard to these framework conditions, the authors see problems for biobanks to
provide the relevant specificity of information under an open consent procedure in re-
lation to at least four categories of information; purpose, recipients, third country
transfers, type of data and consequences of processing.z
Purpose
Under Article 14(1)(b)aa, the biobank has the obligation to provide the data subject
with information as to ‘the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended’
(European Commission 2012a, Article 14(1)(b)).
It is clear that blanket consent is prohibited (requesting consent to all future process-
ing purposes). ‘Open consent’, however, is clearly not ‘blanket consent’. The scope of
open consent is not to seek justification for every possible future use of data, but to
seek justification for the future use of personal data in research. The UK Biobank, in
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able only to researchers’ (UK Biobank 2010).
However, simply as a biobank can elaborate a broad purpose of ‘research’, and does
not seek ‘blanket consent’ does not mean it has adequately fulfilled its obligations
under 14(1)(b). ‘Research’ is not a monolithic description of purpose. In fact, it can be
better described as ‘sectoral’ description of purpose (Nomper 2005, pp 172–174).
Chapter IX of the Regulation elaborates specific rules for certain forms of data proces-
sing. Amongst these situations in the Commission’s version, for example, are health
(Article 81), employment (Article 82) and research (Article 83) (European Commission
2012a, Articles 81, 82, 83). ‘Research’ can be further subdivided, along a number of
axes, into many sub-categories – for example, aids research, cancer research, stem cell
research. Each of these categories could be further sub-divided, and so on.
Unfortunately for biobanks, available guidance related to the specificity of purpose in
processing suggests that information only outlining a ‘sectoral’ purpose is insufficient.
First, such guidance is available in relation to the concept of ‘purpose limitation’. The
concept of ‘purpose limitation’ operates to set limiting conditions on the scope of pro-
cessing. It is one of the general principles of data processing laid down in Article 5 of
the Regulation and is applicable to all processing situations.bb Although it does not dir-
ectly clarify the conditions of consent, the concept of ‘purpose limitation’ in Article 5
and the concept of ‘purpose specificity’ in relation to 9(2)(a) are tightly linked (Article
29 Data Protection Working Party 2013, pp 13–14). Guidance related to one can act as
a guideline as to how to interpret the other. In this regard, the Article 29 Working
Party have stated that ‘[v]ague or general purposes such as ‘improving users’ experience’,
‘marketing’, ‘IT-security’ or ‘future research’ will – without more detail – usually not meet
the criteria of being ‘specific’ [emphasis added] (Schulte in den Bäumen et al. 2010, p 52).
Second, there is relevant guidance directly related to the conditions of consent. Of par-
ticular relevance in the case of biobanking, is the exemplary guidance on consent and
Electronic Health Records (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2007b). This is par-
ticularly relevant as it refers to a situation in which data classified as ‘sensitive’ by the
Regulation are processed. The Article 29 Working Party state that: ‘consent must relate to
a well-defined, concrete situation in which the processing of medical data is envisaged
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2007b, p 9). Therefore a ‘general agreement’ of
the data subject e.g. to the collection of his medical data for an EHR and to subsequent
transfers of these medical data of the past and of the future to health professionals in-
volved in treatment would not constitute consent’.Future recipients of data
Article 14(f )cc requires the biobank to provide the subject with information as to ‘the
recipients or categories of recipients of personal data’. (European Commission 2012a,
Article 14(f )).
It is clear that the biobank cannot list, at the moment of consent, the precise set of
future recipients. Only after open consent has been given will researchers, and research
projects, begin to apply to use the material. However, the biobank can offer information
as to ‘the categories of recipients’. As the purpose is ‘research’, the recipients of samples
can be described under the category of ‘researchers’. The UK biobank does precisely
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The category ‘researchers’ is, however, very broad. The category of ‘researchers’ could
consist of a number of subdivisions – researchers at institution X, researchers in pro-
ject Y cancer researchers, stem cell researchers etc. Once again, each of these categories
could be subdivided, and so on. The question is thus the same as the question that
arose in relation to purpose. Can we say that the category ‘researchers’ is sufficiently
specific?
The Article 29 Working party opinion on Electronic Health Records provides an indica-
tion that it is not. The opinion states: ‘a ‘general agreement’ of the data subject e.g. to the
collection of his medical data for an EHR and to subsequent transfers of these medical
data…to health professionals…would not constitute consent’ (Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party 2007b, p 9). In this example, there is reference to a broad category of
recipients – ‘health professionals’ – as part of reason for the failure of consent. From the
example it is not conclusive that consent would fail solely due to the breadth of class of
recipient. However, in combination with a lack of specificity of purpose, the consent
certainly fails.
In another example, the Article 29 Working Party considers the example of passing
personal data to third parties for the purposes of direct marketing. They suggest that if
user consent is obtained, then data – for example e-mail addresses – may be given to
undefined third parties in the future (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2007b).
This has been used as an argument to suggest that the data subject could consent to the
passing of their data to a broad category of undefined future recipients. This would open
the door to the biobanks to rely on ‘researchers’ as a category of sufficient precision
(Nomper 2005, pp 172–174). However, this analysis is only partially correct. In their
Opinion, the Working Party go on to state that, even if the future recipients of data are
not specified, ‘the information provided to the data subject should then indicate the pur-
pose(s), the goods and services…for which those parties would send e-mails’ (Article 29
Data Protection Working Party 2004b, p 5). Accordingly, a consent suggesting the passing
of personal data to a group of future, undefined, recipients, could only be regarded as
legitimate if the purpose for which these recipients would be allowed to process data were
specific. As above, this is not possible for the biobank to do.
Third country transfers
Article 14(1)(g)ee of the Commission’s version requires the biobank to provide the data
subject with information as to ‘the plans of the controller to transfer data to third
countries, which countries and the details as to the adequacy of these countries’ data
protection arrangements’ (European Commission 2012a, Article 14(1)(g)). The Parlia-
ment’s version adds that reference to other mechanisms allowing cross-border data
transfer would also suffice. Interestingly, the Council’s version removes the obligation
to provide information on the adequacy of standards of protection in the third country.
Of course, provision of information in this category is not necessarily problematic for
an open consent procedure. The requirement to provide information in this category
only becomes relevant when transfer of samples or data is envisaged to third countries
outside the EU. This means that any EU biobank operating open consent procedures,
planning only to provide samples and data to domestic or European researchers, and to
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the EU, need not worry about this requirement.
However, large scale biobanks, and the research communities they serve, are becom-
ing more international. It is questionable whether such biobanks will operate domestic-
ally in reality. The larger the biobank becomes, the more likely this is to be the case.
The Geenivaramu supports projects from around the world as does the UK Biobank.
The UK biobank explicitly states ‘bona fide researchers working in countries around
the world will be able to apply to use the resource’ http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/all-
faqs/ (last consulted 27.11.2013). In its consent materials the data subject is simply
informed, in a broad fashion, that data may be transferred to third countries in the con-
text of future use (UK Biobank 2010, p 8).
Open consent procedures are in place precisely as it is not desirable, at the time of
collection, to state recipients of data. If it is not possible to list applicants or recipients
of data in advance, then it is equally impossible to list the countries of origin of those
recipients. This is problematic under every version of the Regulation.
Needless to say, if the countries cannot be named, then the level of protection (or
any relevant adequacy agreements) cannot be named either. This is difficult to recon-
cile with Article 14(1)(g) of the Commission and Parliament texts. The Council version
would seem to be a little more conducive here as it does not mention information as to
adequate protection. Nevertheless, jurisprudence on cross-border data transfers from
the Article 29 Working Party – which would still be applicable even in the case the
Council’s wording was adopted – states; ‘the data controller must be able to prove in
all cases that, firstly, he has obtained the consent of each data subject and, secondly,
that this consent was given on the basis of sufficiently precise information, including
information on the lack of protection in the third country’ (Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party 2005, p 5).
Data collected
At the moment of collection, the biobank must give the subject a specific description
of the data to be processed. Some data processed by the biobank may be collected
through application forms or in discussion with participants.ff This data can be
regarded as ‘normal data’ – Manson refers to this as ‘communicative data’ (see section
13). It is in the form of comprehensible information and communicates limited and de-
fined knowledge about the data subject. The biobank can be specific with regard to this
data. However, the main source of biobanks’ value is in the biological samples they col-
lect and the genetic data contained therein. The whole genome is contained in this
sample. Accordingly, at the moment of collection, the biobank could be no more
precise than to state: a source of genetic data, containing the whole genome, has been
collected. This raises at least two questions.
First, the possession of an individual’s genome is the possession of a source of further
data about the individual. A genome is extracted from DNA. DNA has four different
chemical building blocks – bases. The average human genome has approximately
3 billion base pairs. The term ‘genetic data’ could refer to any number of bases, up to
the complete genome. Whilst the sequenced bases themselves constitute personal data,
a series of letters is largely irrelevant (unless the series can be used as a unique identi-
fier).gg However, when the relevant interpretative frame is applied to a given set of
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be analysed. There are a huge number of traits which can potentially be analysed from
any given sample. These vary broadly in form, describing not only physical attributes
(blue eyes), but also current, or future, medical (has condition A; does not have condi-
tion A, is P% likely to contract condition A in the future) or social status (has genetic
predisposition toward social characteristic S) (Taylor 2012, pp 41–53).
The only factor serving to group these traits is their source material. Accordingly, whilst
‘genetic data’ is listed as a category of data in the Regulation, the authors do not regard
this as a useful, or specific, description of data which has been collected. By claiming that
‘genetic data’ had been collected, a biobank would be doing nothing more than referen-
cing source material. This seems very difficult to reconcile with the obligation to give spe-
cific descriptions of data which had been collected and were to be processed.
Second, the content and amount of information capable of being extracted from the
genome at any given time, is dependent on the state of genetic science at that time. Ac-
cordingly, developments in genetic science will expand the content and form of infor-
mation about the individual which can be extracted from the sample.
It could be argued that future uncertainty is inherent in all transactions, data based
or otherwise, consent based or otherwise. However the significance of the future poten-
tial of genetic data has received specific legal recognition. The ECtHR observes this fea-
ture of genetic data as integral to its sensitivity and its interaction with individual
rights. The court states: ‘Indeed, bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the
field of genetics and information technology, the Court cannot discount the possibility
that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be
adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with preci-
sion today’ (S. and Marper v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights 2008,
§ 71). Accordingly, this is a feature of genetic data which demands serious consider-
ation in any processing context.
Open consent would allow the continued processing of data into the future, regard-
less of changes in genetic science. The UK Biobank state: ‘during follow-up over the
next few decades, your stored samples will be analysed for approved health-related re-
search’ (UK Biobank 2010, p 3). For consent to provide legitimation to process data,
this consent must be based on accurate information. For consent to continue to pro-
vide legitimation over time, the information on which it was based must remain accur-
ate. Accordingly, there will be some point at which the science behind processing has
so materially changed data which can be extracted from the sample, that the initial con-
sent cannot be held to be valid – if it ever was.hh
The above analysis paints a negative picture for open consent. Under the conditions
laid out in the Regulation, open consent looks unlikely to succeed.
However, this is not the end of the road for open consent. Before it can be concluded
that open consent is incompatible with data protection law, a further set of arguments
must be considered. Proponents of the open consent process have suggested that there
are mechanisms in data protection law which may serve to relax the problematic infor-
mational obligations outlined in sections 6 to 9. This set of arguments can be related to
a third question Kosta asks: ‘to what extent [do] the informational rights of the data
subject or obligations of the data controller…influence the information that should be
provided’ (Kosta 2011, p 176).
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the data subject can serve to relax informational obligations. Second, that the other
protections provided by biobanks can serve as a substitute for the provision of specific
information.
Do the expectations of the data subject serve to relax conditions of consent?
This first argument suggests that the data subject has the right to alter the relevant
rules on consent. Thus, should the data subject have a certain reasonable expectation
of processing which will occur, the data subject has the right to enter into this transac-
tion despite the legal limitations which would otherwise prohibit such a transaction. So,
the data subject could allow open consent, even though it may violate the conditions
laid down by the Regulation.
Although the idea that the data subject could alter the requisite informational obligations
finds no expression in the Regulation itself, it does finds some justification in data protec-
tion jurisprudence. The Article 29 Working Party clearly states that the ‘granularity’ – a
word often used when referring to specificity – of a given consent should be ‘based on
the reasonable expectations of the parties’ (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
2011, p 17). However, the extent to which conditions can be changed on the grounds
of ‘reasonable expectations’ is unsure. The Article 29 working party foresees the ex-
pectations of the parties as only one factor relevant in determining the informational
obligations of consent – the other half being the objective criteria laid out in sections
4 and 5, above.
In the opinion of the authors, it seems unlikely that the expectations of the parties
was ever meant to function as the sole, or main, principle in deciding the relevance of
statutory informational obligations in a given situation. This would have the effect of
rendering the obligations and conditions laid out in the Regulation, and elsewhere,
meaningless. Allowing open consent on the basis of the desire of the data subject
would go far beyond taking the data subject’s expectations into account. It would con-
stitute granting the data subject the right to remove statutory conditions on consent.
Do safeguards serve to relax conditions of consent?
As well as obtaining consent to process data, biobanks may employ a number of other
‘buffer safeguards’ which aim at avoiding privacy harms to the individual. These include
technical measures, such as data security systems, pseudonymisation and anony-
misation of data. They also include organizational approaches. For example, governance
systems – including ethics committees – which take data subject’s rights into account
when deciding on biobank activity. The argument follows that the presence of such
‘buffer safeguards’ should allow the relaxation of the informational conditions on the
initial consent.
Generally speaking, the reduction of risk through technical or organizational mea-
sures is well recognized in data protection law. Indeed, risk reduction measures can be
relied on as grounds to reduce other obligations in data protection law. For example,
anonymisation of data voids the applicability of data protection law. Indeed, the Article
29 Working Party suggests, in relation to pseudonymized data, that ‘the risks at stake
for the individuals with regard to the processing of such indirectly identifiable infor-
mation will most often be low, so that the application of [data protection] rules will
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processed (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2007a, p 18).
However, how risk reduction interacts with the requirements for legitimate consent
in the Regulation is uncertain. There is clearly some connection. For example, sensitive
data represent a greater risk, and therefore it more specific information should be
provided be the data controller. Nevertheless, there is little in the current law to sup-
port the argument that buffer safeguards should serve to reduce relevant consent
requirements.
Formally, there is no reference in the Articles referring to the conditions of consent,
nor in Article 14, to a reduced standard of obligation based on risk reduction mecha-
nisms being in place.ii In turn, the authors know of no relevant jurisprudence defining
how, or how far, such risk reduction approaches can function to change the relevant
conditions of consent. Finally, certain risk reduction mechanisms are statutorily obli-
gated in all processing contexts anyway. For example, in Article 30, the Regulation lays
out the conditions on privacy by design. The controller is obligated to institute
‘organizational and technical measures’…‘proportionate to the risks [of processing]’
(European Commission 2012a, Article 30). It is difficult to see why, without specific
mention, that the presence of such mechanisms should ever allow a relaxation of other
statutory obligations – for example those on consent.
Even if one accepts arguments that risk reduction approaches could reduce the rele-
vant standard of information required, it is not clear that they would always be ap-
plicable in the biobanking context. There is doubt as to how effective certain risk
reduction approaches can be in the biobanking context. In section 2, we have already
discussed our skepticism at the idea of anonymisation and pseudonymisation in genetic
data and in biobanking. Lunshof et al. generally suggest that claims as to the effective-
ness technical approaches to risk reduction procedures in large scale biobanks may be
greatly exaggerated (Lunshof et al. 2008, pp 4–6). Nor are the authors convinced that
governance systems, such as ethics committees, can be truly regarded as risk reduction
mechanisms. Governance systems are essentially oversight and proportionality me-
chanisms. In this regard such mechanisms take decisions as to whether processing is
justified without the individual’s involvement. Proportionality mechanisms, may, but do
not necessarily, reduce overall risk for the individual (Petrini 2010, pp 217–220).
Lex ferenda – a change of consent conditions for biobanks?
The analysis above concludes that open consent cannot meet the standards demanded
by the Regulation.
However, the problematic informational obligations are not rights, which prima facie
need to be protected. They emerged from the legislative process. They are results of
political consideration as to the function of the consent, and the need to balance rights
and interests involved in each consent transaction.
The authors would argue that there are a number of features of the biobanking con-
text, and of genetic data, which do not fit the assumptions made in the legislative
process. Accordingly, the reasoning behind the approach to, and strictness of, the con-
ditions laid out in the Regulation, may not be relevant to biobanking. In turn, there is
ground for the political reconsideration of the conditions relevant to consent in
biobanking.
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relation to a different context, and set of rights and interests, than those prevalent in
biobanking. Second, that the approach taken to consent in the Regulation is poorly
applicable to any instance in which a genetic sample, or genetic data, is processed.
De lege ferenda, such argumentation supports a call for a debate on biobank specific
consent conditions. The elaboration of such sector specific rules is not only feasible, it
is encouraged under the Regulation. Indeed, one of the main driving factors for data
protection reform was that the Directive lacked the flexibility to deal with novel pro-
cessing situations.
In terms of legal procedure, there are a number of ways such a set of rules could be
brought into existence. The Regulation is still before the Council and changes can still
be made as part of the normal legislative process. Equally, the Regulation conceives of a
number of mechanisms for interpretation and adaptation to specific, or novel, proces-
sing scenarios – for example the consistency mechanism laid out in Chapter VII and
the establishment of the European Data Protection Board. Finally, in the original ver-
sion of the Regulation, the Commission was given the power, under Article 9(3) to;
‘further [specify] the criteria, conditions and appropriate safeguards for the processing
of the special categories of personal data referred to in paragraph 1 and the exemptions
laid down in paragraph 2 [of Article 9]’ (European Commission 2012a). The European
Data Protection Board is granted a similar power in the Parliament’s Consolidated
Version.
Where does the regulation’s concept of ‘specific and informed’ come from: does this
remain relevant to biobanking?
In relation to the underlying rights data protection law seeks to protect, the original
position is that the data subject has the right to informational self-determination.
Without justification, this right should not be limited. In essence, the data subject has
‘the right to take a risk’ and to do whatever they want with their data regardless of
uncertainty or potential future risk (Schulte in den Bäumen et al. 2010, pp 39–40;
Taupitz & Weigel 2012, pp 265–266). This is exemplified by Article 9(2)(e) which
allows the possibility for the data subject to ‘manifestly’ make their data public. The
data subject thus has the ability to publicly release their genetic code and all infor-
mation which the biobank would collect in an open consent procedure. A far more
intransparent and risky act.
Consent, however, is a transaction between two parties which allows one party to
engage in an action which would otherwise be prohibited. In this regard, it is the mani-
festation of the right to informational self-determination in the Regulation. A central
condition for all consent transactions is that the parties transact on the basis of relevant
knowledge and understanding (Beyleveld & Brownsword 2007, pp 145–146). This is
the rationale behind the obligation to obtain ‘specific and informed’ consent.
There are two general reasons legislators choose to specify more precise statutory
conditions relating to informational criteria in consent transactions. First, these may be
necessary to provide a standard framework in which a transaction can take place – a
set of rules for a legitimate interaction. Second, they may be necessary to correct for
imbalance in the context in which consent takes place. In particular, they may be
needed to correct for the danger that that the consent mechanism allows one party to
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mational obligations related to ‘specific and informed’ consent are tightly tied to this
second justification. In particular, the data subject is seen as a vulnerable party in need
to protection.
However, the setting of legislative standards on relevant knowledge and information,
must also be considered in the light of the trade off it entails. On the one hand, the
more information that must be provided to the data subject, the more ‘informed’ that
data subject might be. On the other hand, the harder it will be for any party to fulfil
the requirements of a legitimate consent, and the more limited the scope of actions
permissible under consent will be – eventually limiting the data subject’s choice, and
right to informational self-determination, as well.
In the legislative discussions leading to the drafting of the Regulation, there was a
focus on consent, and on the conditions of consent (European Commission 2012b).
Such discussions predominantly revolved around the online context – particularly so-
cial networks. Of course, this is not the only area covered by the Regulation. However,
its prevalence in the legislative discussion is indicative of the perception of the relevant
context and interests. Certain important features of the discussion of the online envir-
onment stand out as significant. First, the interests of the parties involved in typical
data processing activities online – for example social networking or e-commerce – can
be expressed in adversarial terms. As personal data form the basis for the business
models of many companies, the right to privacy of the data subject may be in direct
opposition to the economic interest of the data controller. Second, when personal data
are processed in an online environment, they often have value in so far as they can be
used, whether directly or indirectly, to leverage benefit against the data subject (or a
group of data subjects) (Manson & O’Neill 2008, pp 115–119). Finally, there was much
discussion as to the intransparency of the online environment, and how this made it
difficult for the data subject to understand what they were consenting to.
In relation to the above, certain conclusions can be drawn as to the concept of uncer-
tainty in consent in the mind of the legislator. First, a lack of information – uncertainty –
is to the disadvantage of the data subject as it provides the space for data controller to
leverage advantage. Second, uncertainty on the part of the data subject may not imply
uncertainty on the part of the data controller. In this case, uncertainty is not neutral, but
obscures a power/information imbalance – facebook may have all the relevant informa-
tion about the context in which it will process, it is unlikely that the data subject has this
same information. In turn, this has a substantive bearing on the ability of the data subject
to understand the processing and to understand its consequences. Accordingly, the desire
of the legislator to protect the data subject uncertainty is understandable. The trade-off in
this case shifts toward stricter informational requirements as a response to the dangers of
uncertainty, albeit at the expense of informational self-determination.
The biobanking context is rather different. First, the two interests which are directly
at stake in biobanking are the privacy of the individual, and the public interest in
medical research. There is not the same type of adversarial relationship which exists be-
tween these interests as exists in the online context.jj Indeed, given that participants’ trust
in researchers, and scientific research in general, is central to effective research, one might
even talk of a confluence of interests. Laurie states: ‘this…does not seek to set interest
against interest but seeks to bring about a confluence of public and private interests. In
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done in biobanking is not aimed at any individual, nor is it done with any intention to
have any effect on an individual. In fact, the individual is only relevant as a point of ad-
ministrative reference – character, identity and personality are irrelevant. The product is
impersonal and undirected scientific knowledge (Manson & O’Neill 2008, pp 115–119).
In an open consent procedure, uncertainty might thus be viewed rather differently. First,
the lack of information is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the data subject, as it is
unlikely to be used to leverage advantage against the data subject. Second – provided that
the transaction is governed by truth and transparency – the lack of information does not
serve to obscure a relevant power/information imbalance. In turn, the lack of information
does not prevent the data subject from making a choice, having been given all current,
available and relevant information about the proposed processing. In this reading, there is
far less reason to protect the data subject through restrictive informational obligations.
Accordingly, one might argue that the trade-off should slide the other way – toward
looser informational obligations and a more permissive approach to allowing the data
subject to decide what happens to their data.
However, this is not the end of the debate. Whilst it is true that the conflict of inter-
ests is qualitatively different in the biobanking context and the online context, this does
not automatically mean open consent is legitimate.
First, there are other regulatory spheres in which open consent has received much
attention; in particular, in relation to the law (and ethics) on biomedical research. There
is still no consensus in this area about the legitimacy of open consent.
Second, there are a series of considerations which are specific to genetics and genomics
which extend beyond the particular relationships involved in the consent transaction. For
example, genetic data are inherited and are therefore may be held in common with others –
for example blood relatives. This means that the processing of other individuals’ genetic
data is implied by the processing of one research subject’s genetic data. Further, genomics
research raises a number of social and ethical themes – eugenics, for example, looms
large. A range of arguments based on consideration of harms to other parties could be
put forward as an alternative justification for limiting the scope of consent; to protect
against ‘uncertainty’ and ‘possible future harm’ as such.
Finally, the above argument has only functionality in relation to some categories of in-
formation. The requirement to provide specific information on international data trans-
fers does not rest on argumentation as to the conflict or confluence of interests between
data subject and data controller. Further, even if it was concluded that the current infor-
mational obligations ought to be relaxed, the problem of the collection of genetic data
would remain. Even if conditions were to be relaxed, the biobank would still be unable to
give a description of the data collected.
The focus of consent, communicative data and genetic data
Manson argues that data protection law has been designed to deal with ‘communicative
information’ (2009, pp18-21). The Regulation follows in this tradition. Communicative
information is information which has already been arranged into a specific linguistic
form, which allows transfer of certain knowledge. The knowledge in question in any
data processing operation is thus perceived to be, to a large extent, a limitable and de-
finable substance.
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proach the subject of consent in terms of definable, quantifiable features. To an extent,
communicative data can play a role as such a feature. It is possible for a data controller
to explain to the data subject the nature of the data which will be processed, and the
knowledge it contains. The individual will in turn be able to conceive of the personal
and social importance of the information and what processing of such knowledge might
mean. Accordingly, the legislator focussed on an ‘act of processing data’ as the subject
of consent, and relied on a specific description of the ‘personal data’ being processed as
a definable, quantifiable feature of this ‘act’.
Biological samples, or raw genetic data, as collected by biobanks, cannot be classified
as ‘communicative information’. Raw genetic material is not information which has
been arranged into knowledge. It has only value for the communicative data it may re-
veal about the data subject in the future. A number of interpretative processes are still
required to produce this. Despite its lack of imminent relevance, it potentially contains
a large quantity of communicative data – a quantity which grows with scientific pro-
gress (section 9) (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2004a, pp 4–5).
Thus, raw genetic material is not a definable substance in terms of knowledge, and is
not a substance which has a clear social or personal meaning. Accordingly, it is not a
definable, quantifiable substance around which a scope of consent can be built. A data
subject cannot understand the personal or social significance of an ‘act of processing’ if
they do not know which data will be processed. In the same way a consumer might
have difficulty in deciding on a purchase if they do not know how much the item costs.
Whilst the above observation does not necessarily support or reject open consent, it
opens the door to consideration of alternative approaches to conceiving consent in
relation to the processing of genetic data. Certain such approaches may not prove so
obstructive to open consent.
Consenting to a specific ‘act’ is only one approach to the subject of consent. Beyleveld
and Brownsword observe that ‘the paradigm of private empowerment involves an agent
freely and with relevant knowledge consenting to the creation of a new relationship. The
change of relationship might involve something as simple as a gift or a promise or the
consent might signal a willingness to be bound by the rules of a game or the outcome of a
voting process (Beyleveld & Brownsword 2007, pp 145–146).’ In the biobanking context,
it has been suggested that, rather than focus on a specific ‘act’, the consent should be to a
set of governance and decision making systems – the research/data subject submits to the
‘rules of the game’ (Nomper 2005, pp 83). As far as the authors are aware, there has been
little consideration of the compatibility of data protection law with the possibility to pro-
vide ‘procedural consent’. Certainly, this seems an unlikely candidate for general ap-
plication. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that a procedural approach to
consent – limited to the biobanking context and with the correct amount of careful
deliberation and transparency – would necessarily be prejudicial to the data subject.
Eventually, the focus on ‘data’ and the ‘act of processing’ are simply useful tools for
approaching the interaction between consent, data processing and underlying rights. If
the focus were to move from the act of processing to the decision making mechanisms
defining whether processing occurs, there may be less obstruction to open consent, as the
same decision making mechanisms would remain the same regardless of the proposed
use, and therefore the consent would remain valid across use purposes.
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Biobanking opens up a number of possibilities in research. Unfortunately, such possibilities
cannot fully be realised under the strict conditions on consent laid down by traditional re-
search ethics. Accordingly, the concept of open consent was developed.
In an open consent procedure, the data subject gives their consent to the biobank collect-
ing and storing their data and genetic material. In the same consent, the data subject gives
their permission for stored data and materials to be used in future research. The specifics
of the research and who will conduct it are not specified at the moment of collection.
As biobanks process personal data, it is necessary that their operation is legitimate
under data protection law. European data protection law is currently undergoing a
process of reform, the first results of which have been outlined in the Proposed Data
Protection Regulation. This paper has considered what the prospects for open consent
under the Regulation are.
First, it considered how open consent should be understood under the Regulation. In
this regard, the authors have argued that the Regulation only provides the opportunity
for biobanks to process data provided they have the consent of the data subject. How-
ever, this consent can only be regarded as legitimate under certain conditions.
Second, the paper considered one sub-set of these conditions which are regarded as
particularly problematic for open consent. The Regulation provides that the data sub-
ject’s consent must be ‘specific and informed’. These obligations are comprised of cri-
teria along two axes. The biobank is obliged to provide the data controller with certain
categories of information. Information in each category must reach a certain level of
specificity. The authors conclude that the biobank will have difficulty in being ad-
equately specific in relation to at least four categories of information:
1. Given that data and samples are collected prospectively, there is no clarity as to
which research projects they will feature in. Accordingly, the biobank cannot be
adequately specific as to the purpose of processing.
2. As the biobank cannot be specific in relation to the purpose of processing, the
biobank will not be able to be adequately specific as to the potential recipients of
data.
3. If the biobank wishes to operate internationally, it cannot, in advance, list the
countries to which data will be transferred.
4. Biobanks collect human samples – these contain the complete genomes of data
subjects. There is a huge amount of data contained in the genome and the
development of genetic science will allow ever increasing amounts of data to be
extracted. Therefore the biobank cannot provide information as to which data have
actually been collected.
Third, the article considered whether there were any mechanisms under data pro-
tection law which would allow a relaxation of these conditions for biobanks. Two argu-
ments were considered: First, that the expectation of the data subject could serve to
relax the relevant informational obligations; second, that the technical and organisa-
tional privacy protection mechanisms provided by the biobank should serve to relax
the relevant informational obligations. The authors found certain support for these
arguments in data protection law. However, the extent to which they would allow a
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they could be used to justify open consent under the Regulation.
Finally, given that open consent cannot succeed under the Regulation de lege lata,
the authors considered whether there was any justification for a legislative reconsi-
deration of the problematic conditions of consent in relation to biobanking. Two argu-
ments support this. First, they suggest that the informational obligations of consent
were designed to protect the data subject from risks inherent in the use of the consent
mechanism in a specific context – exemplified by the online context. They argue that
the biobank context is not comparable to this context and does not present the same
risk to the data subject. Second, they suggest that the legislator drafted the Regulation
based on certain assumptions as to the nature of ‘data’. The authors argue that these
assumptions are difficult to apply to genetic data and accordingly, any consent which
aims at defining an ‘act of processing’ will inevitably be unclear.
Endnotes
aLegal analysis has been conducted into whether the current Directive allows for
open consent. Such analyses have generally concluded that open consent policies can-
not meet the requirements of consent under the Directive due to the lack of specificity
of information communicated (Schulte in den Bäumen et al. 2010). Certain of these
analyses consider that open consent could be legitimated under public interest excep-
tions – for example that laid out in Article 8(4) (Schulte in den Bäumen et al. 2010).
The authors agree that open consent cannot fulfil the prerequisites for legitimate con-
sent in the Directive, but disagree that such public interest exceptions are necessarily
applicable. In this we rather share the interpretation of Kaye (2004). The arguments laid
out in footnote 12 in relation to such public interest exceptions in the Regulation are
applicable to equivalent Articles in the Directive.
The obvious question which follows from this is: If open consent is a problem (or at
least a disputed practise) under the Directive, then why does it seem to continue un-
challenged in certain biobanks? This is a question which deserves further research but
is beyond the scope of the legal analysis conducted in this article.
bThis article takes the Regulation as its unit of analysis. The authors feel this is
legitimate as the Regulation will constitute a stand-alone piece of legislation. First, this
is true in terms of legislative content. Whilst the Regulation emerges from, and shares
many similarities with, its predecessor the Directive, the two are not the same law.
What was, and is, true in the case of the Directive, will not necessarily be so in the case
of the Regulation. Second, this is also true in relation to the Regulation’s potential role
in legislating for biobanks. The Directive is applicable to biobanking, but as a legal
framework it suffers from a number of flaws making it fragmented, confusing and diffi-
cult to apply; differences in national transposition – meaning it lacks harmonisation
and cross border biobanking may be subject to numerous regional differences – uncer-
tainty as to how and when it formally applies – does it apply to samples and data, what
exactly is the status of genetic data etc. – uncertainty as to which role it plays in the
broader body of law applicable to biobanking – with which it sometimes even conflicts.
Accordingly, data protection law has been somewhat perceived as a confusing ob-
struction to the work of biobanks. The Regulation moves toward a resolution of these
issues as it will clarify and harmonise data protection law across Europe and provide a
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data protection law from a framework of obstruction, to one offering opportunity. As
biobanking grows, becomes more networked, more internationalised and comes to
occupy a greater role in medical research, there are corresponding increases in calls to
clarify the applicable legal provisions. The European level framework of hard law pro-
vided by the Regulation would offer one such clear and harmonised legal framework.
cA significant portion of modern medical research follows the Genome Wide Associ-
ation Study methodology. Such studies draw wide scale comparisons between popula-
tions with, and without, a certain trait (disease/health condition)
dPresumed consent/opt out is often discussed as a form of consent and accordingly,
the authors have included it in this section. However, the authors do not see this as a
bona fide form of consent. Consent requires an active expression of will to allow
another to engage in a practise which would otherwise infringe upon an individual’s
rights. In an opt out procedure, no active expression of will is present. Rather, the
authors see this as a public interest justification with a secondary deference to indi-
vidual will.
eThe authors find the idea of dynamic consent very interesting and very promising.
However, it has, up to now, been little used. Equally, a concern which led to inception
of open consent was that, with constantly asking research participants for consent to
each and every newly proposed research project, research participants would suffer
consent overload and would cease to engage with biobanks. Perhaps this risk is also
present with dynamic consent.
fSectoral consent may be very useful for limited purpose, or disease specific, bio-
banks. However, the larger, more prospective and more networked a biobank becomes,
the more likely it is that sectoral consent will be regarded as too limited.
gHowever, it should also be noted that the term ‘blanket consent’ appears elsewhere
in data protection jurisprudence to refer to a consent with no boundaries at all. This
should not be confused with the concept of open consent as we use it in this article –
restricted to research uses of collected materials.
hMaterial will only be released to researchers following the consideration of their pro-
posals by mechanisms for quality, and ethics control – Research Ethics Committees,
for example, ensure that research proposals fulfil relevant criteria. Samples and data
will then be released to the researcher/project under specific agreed conditions of use.
It may be the case that information extracted from samples, or the samples themselves
are thus further distributed – for example through publication – by the researchers
given permission to use the samples.
iThe technological background to the drafting of the Directive has changed. Develop-
ments in the ability to extract and interpret genetic data can be counted among such
changes. Simultaneously, the legal context in which the Directive was embedded has
changed. The Directive is no longer seen to reflect the European legal architecture of
which it forms a part. The signing into force of the Lisbon treaty represented a key mo-
ment in the constitutionalisation of data protection law. Two aspects of Lisbon are of
particular significance. First, Article 16 of the Treaty of the Function of the European
Union (under the heading of ‘general provisions’ rather than ‘internal market’) provides
the Union with an explicit legal basis for the adoption of data protection rules. Second,
Article 8 of the Charter specifically lists data protection as a fundamental right and
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been seen to have serious shortcomings in the harmonization of European data protec-
tion law. National transpositions differ significantly – the transposition of the condi-
tions of consent differ considerably from country to country.
jThe Parliament’s version adds that the application of the Regulation follows
‘irrespective of the method of processing’, whilst the Council propose no changes. This
does not constitute a substantially significant alteration for the purposes of this
analysis.
kRecital 23 states: ‘The principles of data protection should not apply to data rendered
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable’ (European
Commission 2012a). Although the Parliament’s version - ‘The principles of data protec-
tion should therefore not apply to anonymous data, which is information that does not
relate to an identified or identifiable natural person. This Regulation does therefore
not concern the processing of such anonymous data, including for statistical and
research purposes‘ – and the Council’s version – adding to the Parliament’s ammend-
ments that: ‘The principles of data protection should not apply to deceased persons’ –
contain alterations to the Commission’s text, these do not serve to change the substantial
meaning of the Article for the purposes of the current analysis. Many large biobanks sub-
ject samples and data to procedures aimed at disguising the identity of the original data
subject – pseudonymising data. The information allowing the subject to be re-identified is
still retained within the biobank, but is not passed to third parties (for example research
projects). It is clear that pseudonymous data are not anonymous and do fall under the
scope of data protection law. The Article 29 Working Party clearly state that: ‘retraceably
pseudonymised data may be considered as information on individuals which are indirectly
identifiable’ – indirect identifiability qualifies data as ‘personal’ within the meaning of data
protection law (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2007a, p.18). The Parliament
clarified this by clarifying pseudonymous data as falling within the scope of protection –
although they regard the severity of consequence as much lower than with the processing
of regular personal data. Biobanks may also claim to process truly anonymised data. How-
ever, there are serious doubts about the effectiveness and applicability of either anonymity,
or pseudonymity procedures to genetic data – the authors have discussed this elsewhere
(Hallinan et al. 2013). Equally, the ever expanding quantity of data which biobanks will
collect and generate about a data subject means it is difficult to state that any anonymisa-
tion or pseudonymisation process will retain efficacy over time. Accordingly, the authors
do not do not believe that data in biobanks should be regarded as effectively anonymised
or pseudonymised.
lData protection is aimed at regulating the processing of personal information. Con-
sidered narrowly, samples are not information, therefore cannot be ‘personal data’ and
therefore cannot fall under the scope of protection. Samples are only valuable however,
as they contain data – it is simply that this data requires further processing to be con-
verted into readable form. Accordingly, they seem to blur the clear line between infor-
mational and corporeal. The Regulation offers no direct answer to this question, and
the available legal sources on both national and international level differ in their
interpretation. For example, on the one hand, the Article 29 Working Party offer guid-
ance to the effect that samples cannot be considered as data (Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party 2007a, p. 9). On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights
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2008, § 68). In this situation of uncertainty, the authors feel that the interpretation of
Bygrave is correct, and the Regulation should be found to apply to samples (Bygrave
2010). Given that the collection and storage of samples constitutes a key part of the
chain of processing, and the Regulation has been tasked with protecting individuals’ in-
terests when their data are being processed, it would make logical and practical sense
to apply data protection law to biological samples in the biobanking context.
mThe Parliament have added ‘philosophical beliefs…sexual orientation or gender
identity, trade union…activities…biometric [data and data on] administrative
sanctions, judgments, criminal or suspected offences’ to this list. The Council have
further suggested that ‘race’ in the Commission’s version, be changed to ‘racial’. These
changes are of some significance, but do not change the substantial relevance of the
Article for the purposes of this analysis.
nThe authors have issues with both proposed approaches to the definition of ‘genetic
data’. On the one hand, the Commission’s definition is very broad. There is almost no
personal data which does not relate to some inherited characteristic. It is clearly not
the case that all personal data should be classified as ‘genetic’. Accordingly, the
Commission’s definition of genetic data is likely to be far too broad and would require
considerable interpretation to narrow its scope. On the other hand, the definition of-
fered in the Parliament and Council versions removes the possibility to interpret any
data, other than that which has been revealed through a specific type of analysis, as
genetic. This would mean that all data which could be conceived of as being genetic in
content, but which was not revealed as the result of a genetic analysis, would not be
regarded as ‘genetic data’. Information as to whether an individual suffered from
haemophilia, for example, would be regarded as genetic if produced through analysis of
the individual’s genome, but would not be regarded as ‘genetic’ if revealed as a result of
an alternative means of diagnosis. Why should it be the process of revealing the infor-
mation which makes the information itself ‘genetic’ or not. Further, it excludes all types
of information which could be subject to a genetic interpretation – i.e. could be used
to reveal genetic information in the future. For example, under this definition, bio-
logical samples would not be conceived of as ‘genetic’, because they had not yet been
subject to a ‘genetic analysis’. This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, in rela-
tion to biological samples, the authors have already expressed their opinion – elabo-
rated in footnote 14 – that, in the biobanking context, the Regulation should apply to
biological samples. Moving from this interpretation, it is only logical that samples be
considered as ‘genetic data’. Given that such samples are only collected for the genetic
information they contain, conceiving of them as any other type of data seems absurd.
Second, in S v. Marper the European Court of Human Rights considered the sensitivity
of genetic data when considering the right of the police in the UK to retain genetic
samples (S. and Marper v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights 2008).
They concluded that such data might be considered as ‘sensitive’ because it had the fu-
ture potential to reveal a great deal of information, some of which – for example health
information – would also be regarded as sensitive. The Article 29 Working Party also
considered the future possibilities of interpretation as a significant factor in the sensi-
tivity of genetic data (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2004a). In the case of
the biological sample, all possibilities for future revelation exist before any analysis has
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content, or interpretative potential, or even context of interpretation, is very restrictive.
Whilst the focus solely on analysis is useful in narrowing down a definition, it leads to
some arbitrary results both in relation to which data is seen as ‘genetic’ and why this
data should be seen as ‘sensitive’, whereas other forms of data, which display the same
characteristics, are excluded.
There remains a lack of clarity regarding the conceptualisation of genetic data in data
protection law. Accordingly whichever interpretation is adopted, it is unlikely that it
will be regarded as iron-clad and the authors believe considerable interpretation will be
necessary.
oThe clause on the prohibition on processing sensitive data remains unchanged in
the Parliament and Council versions. The Parliament adds two further exceptions
under 9(2): 9(2)(aa) relating to the excecution of a contract and 9(2)(ja) relating to pro-
cessing for archiving purposes. The Council have suggested the deletion of Article 9(2)
(j) – relating to the processing of data relating to criminal convictions. Neither of these
amendments are relevant for the current analysis.
pThe Parliament and Council versions retain consent as a justification to process
sensitive data in 9(2)(a).
qThere is a small nuance to this argument which is elaborated in the first paragraph
of footnote 21.
rThere are also practical reasons consent ought to be sought. The scope and success
of medical research relies on the involvement, and trust, of research participants. In
biobanking, fostering such trust is tightly linked to the involvement of research subjects
in the biobanking process. The consent process puts the individual in charge of their
own participation, and accordingly over their input into the biobanking project.
sWhilst the authors adhere to the position that there is a lexical order to legitimating
grounds under Article 9(2), it has been argued that this is not the case. Equally, it has
been suggested that – as will be argued in the following sections of this article – if open
consent cannot be regarded as legitimate under the conditions of consent in the Regu-
lation, this means that biobanks are in fact not able to obtain consent as understood in
9(2)(a). The authors also object to this position. Open consent is the most convenient
and research-optimal consent mode for biobanks as it allows maximum possible re-
search use of samples with minimum administrative burden. However, this does not
mean that biobanks’ work is necessarily impossible under the conditions laid out in 9
(2)(a). Certainly, this mean administrative inconvenience and less optimal opportunities
to use samples but this is a different proposition to the suggestion that biobanks could
not obtain consent as understood under 9(2)(a). This is especially true given consent
modes made possible through technology – see above, for example, on dynamic
consent.
Nevertheless, if either of these arguments are taken forward, a different Article 9(2) ex-
ception would need to be found under which biobank processing could be legitimated.
There are only a limited number of possible exemptions among 9(2)(b) – (j) which seem
applicable. In particular, 9(2)(g) and (9)(2)(i) have been put forward (Schulte in den
Bäumen et al. 2010 pp, 37–38). Further inspection of these grounds shows 9(2)(i) as
offering a real possibility to legitimate biobank processing, but only in the Commission
and Council versions.
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for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of high public interest, on the
basis of Union law, or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim
pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable
measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject’.
There are at least four objections which could be made to the applicability of 9(2)(g).
First, there is no encompassing European level legislation on biobanking. Accordingly,
any justification on the grounds of 9(2)(g) would need to be on the basis of a relevant
national provision. National provisions would likely be divergent. In legal terms, this is
undesirable as it would mean a fragmentation of data protection law relating to
biobank research. In practical terms, a key obstacle which has hampered international
biobanking practise has been the lack of a harmonised legal framework. The Regulation
would thus be a golden opportunity for biobanking – one which would be missed if
justification for processing were to be found in national law. Second, use of Article 9(2)
(g) would require biobanking research to qualify as a ‘high public interest’. Whilst there
is no clarification as to exactly what constitutes a ‘high public interest’, one would pre-
sume that research in the ‘high public interest’ would need to be focussed on producing
imminent output to meet a specific pressing social need. It is debatable whether bio-
banks do this (Rouvroy 2008, pp 13–55). The value of large scale biobank based re-
search in terms of usable medicines (at least in relation to the amount of resourced
invested) has yet to materialise. Third, it is not always the case that biobanks are oper-
ated purely in the public interest. The Icelandic DeCode bank, for example, was owned
by a private corporation (Arnason 2007, pp 1–2). Nor is it certain that the results will
be directly for public benefit. Application to biobank resources may be open to private
institutions. First line beneficiaries of research would then be company shareholders,
rather than the public at large. Equally, the beneficiary ‘public’ may be quite different
to the public in whose name biobanking was supposedly a ‘high interest’. For example,
research done on biobank samples sent abroad may eventually be of benefit in another
country. Finally, in order for 9(2)(g) to apply, there must be national legislation which
provides for ‘suitable measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of
the data subject’. Biobanking poses a specific set of risks to the data subject. This is
especially due to the ever expanding quantity of information they collect, the fact that
genetic data is collected and the fact that the uses of this data are uncertain at the
moment of collection. Accordingly, reliance on 9(2)(g) would arguably need to be on
the back of a specific law reflecting the specifics of biobanking research. General legis-
lation – for example legislation providing a general exemption for research purposes –
would fail to ‘safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject’.
Such biobank specific legislation exists in only few Member States.
2 Article 9(2)(i): This allows processing of sensitive data if ‘processing is necessary
for historical, statistical or scientific research purposes subject to the conditions and
safeguards referred to in Article 83’. In Article 83 of the Commission and Council ver-
sions, biobanks could certainly fulfil the obligations laid out. If the primacy of consent
is questioned, or it is seen that it is impossible for the biobank to gain consent under
the conditions of 9(2)(a), then these versions of Article 83 would provide a viable alter-
native for legitimating biobank processing. However, the conditions of Article 83 are
the subject of some disagreement. When health data are processed under 9(2)(i) of the
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Article applies to biobanks. Biobanks may process data which can be directly identified
as ‘health data’ in the form of medical records. However, Recital 26 also clarifies that
‘health data’ include both ‘information derived from the testing or examination of a
body part or bodily substance, including biological samples; or any information on e.g.
a disease, disability, disease risk, medical history, clinical treatment, or the actual phy-
siological or biomedical state of the data subject’. Accordingly, almost all biobank pro-
cessing can also be conceived of as the processing of health data. Article 81 contains
three clauses which seem of significance: Article 81(1b) and Article 81(2) and Article
81(2a). Article 81(1b) states that: ‘Where the data subject's consent is required for the
processing of medical data exclusively for public health purposes of scientific research,
the consent may be given for one or more specific and similar researches. However, the
data subject may withdraw the consent at any time’. Anecdotally, the authors have
heard that this provision was meant to cover the possibility for open consent to be used
in scientific research involving health data. However, we have not found any clear
indication that this is the case. It is true that Article 81(1b) would allow the data sub-
ject to give consent to multiple research uses in advance. However, the authors feel that
Article 81(1b) does not practically open up any new possibilities which would not be
possible under a justification following 9(2)(a). A data subject is quite free to give any
number of specific consents to different processing operations. Simply because these
are secured at the same time and place does not, of itself, serve to invalidate any, or all
of them. By extension, the authors believe that this provision, by itself, cannot serve to
legitimate open consent. Under 81(1b) each research use would still need to be specific-
ally elaborated. In turn, the scope of this ‘collection of consents’ is limited to research
which is ‘similar’ – although quite how broadly this could be interpreted is unclear.
This is still a significant step short of open consent, which constitutes one consent, for
all future research purposes. In open consent, no research purpose is specifically clari-
fied, nor is it necessarily the case that research purposes will be ‘similar’ to one another.
Article 81(2) states that health data may only be processed for research ‘with the con-
sent of the data subject’. In Article 81, there are no further clarifications to the concept
of ‘consent’. There is no reference to any special conditions under which Article 81
consent should be regarded as legitimate, nor are there any indications that Article 81
consent refers to a concept of consent from another area of law. Therefore we must
conclude that ‘consent’ in Article 81 must refer to ‘consent’ as it appears elsewhere in
the Regulation and is subject to the same conditions. Finally, Article 81(2a) provides an
exception to consent for medical research, this follows only for ‘research that serves a
high public interest if that research cannot possibly be carried out otherwise’. As we
have argued earlier in this footnote, we find it difficult to automatically justify bio-
banking as research which serves a ‘high public interest’.
tThere are a number of other conditions which must also be fulfilled. Certain of these
may also cause problems for open consent. However, the requirement that consent be ‘spe-
cific and informed’ is perhaps the biggest obstacle to open consent in data protection law.
The Parliament’s version retains the same wording as the Commission’s. The Council alters
the wording slightly, removing the term ‘explicit’. The Council add that consent must be
‘explicit’ in 9(2)(a) of their version. The concept of ‘explicit’ particularly refers to the signa-
lling requirements of a given consent, rather than the informational content of that consent.
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consent – but for the purpose of this article we will remain with the generally applic-
able situation.
There are a number of changes to the Commission text in the Parliament and Coun-
cil versions. Only those of significance will be specifically listed.
vIn their version of Article 14, the Council have also removed the obligation for the
controller to inform the data subject as to how long information will be stored for.
They also have not seen it necessary to include information corresponding with the
Commission‘s version Article 14(gb) and 14(ha). None of these alterations is relevant
for the current analysis.
wWhilst this is not explicitly mentioned in Article 14, it could be seen to be implied in
the Regulation. First, ‘the data’ are referred to a number of times in relation to the other
categories of information. Second, the aim of Article 14 is to provide the data subject with
information describing the relevant factors of a proposed processing operation. It would
be almost impossible for the data subject to begin to conceive of facts and implications of
a processing operation without information as to ‘what’ is actually being processed. It may
be that the legislator presumed that it was obvious that, when data are collected from a
data subject, that this subject would know what ‘data’ they were.
xNeither Article 14(1), nor the explanations of the Article 29 Working Party create
an exhaustive list of categories of data comprising the informational obligations of the
data controller. Article 14(1) explicitly states the necessity to provide the data subject
with; ‘any further information necessary to guarantee fair processing’ (European
Commission 2012a). Whilst it is not easy to draw categories of information directly from
the idea of ‘fair processing’, it is possible to generally link the idea of fair processing to risk
in processing. Indeed, the Parliament’s version of 14(h) extends this obligation to
include information relating to: ‘the existence of certain processing activities and
operations for which a personal data impact assessment has indicated that there
may be a high risk’. Accordingly, it can be argued that any aspect of processing, rele-
vant to defining the risk which might arise from processing, could fall under the cat-
egory of ‘additional information necessary’ – depending on the context. In the case of
biobank based research – which would be subject to an impact assessment under the
conditions laid out in Article 33 – the processing of samples and data is done through
the framework provided by genetic science. This interpretative framework has rules
and limits. These rules and limits define what can and cannot be done with samples
and materials. Accordingly, they shape the implications (and risk) of processing for the
data subject. With this in mind, the authors believe that certain information as to the
characteristics of the interpretative framework ought to be communicated to the data
subject. This would constitute a separate category in itself. We have left this out of the
paper, as there are no current statutory, or jurisprudential guides as to the necessity of
this information. Accordingly, there is no evidence that this category should be a legal
problem for the legitimacy of open consent.
However, the authors do wonder how much information would need to be provided
under this ground, and whether this could be provided within a consent procedure –
genetic science is complicated and vast.
At first glance, the answer appears to be yes. The obligation that the data subject un-
derstands some features of genetic science is not limited to biobanks employing open
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the Regulation lists ‘genetic data’ as a form of data which can be processed with the data
subject’s consent. As the Regulation confirms the normative position that the data subject
can consent to the processing of their genetic data it also implicitly suggests that the
controller must be able to communicate the relevant information about genetic science.
Following this line of reasoning, the obligation to communicate some amount of genetic
science to the data subject does not, in principle, constitute a legislative block to open
consent. It should be noted however, that this does not mean that practically this is not an
issue. Current open consent procedures in Europe do not appear to even attempt to ex-
plain any aspect of the interpretative framework which will be applied to data collected.
In the consent materials for both the UK biobank and the Geenivaramu – the Estonian
biobank – there is not a single reference to the basics of genetics.
At a second glance however, it seems a counter-argument could also be put forward.
In the history of data protection law, there have been a number of approaches which
have sought to limit the ability of, and the situations in which, the data subject could
consent. One line of argumentation – which has been increasingly prominent as tech-
nology has developed – is that there are situations in which the background processing
operations are significant to the consequences of the processing but are too complex
for the data subject to understand (Solove 2012). In ‘The Future of Privacy’ – an early
contribution to the reform process leading to the Regulation – the Article 29 Working
Party summarize this argument: ‘the requirement that consent has to be informed
starts from the assumption that it needs to be fully understandable to the data subject
what will happen if he decides to consent to the processing of his data. However, the
complexity of data collection practices, business models, vendor relationships and
technological applications in many cases outstrips the individual’s ability or willingness
to make decisions to control the use and sharing of information through active choice’
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2009). This line of argumentation has, up to
now, been focused at processing in the online environment. However, the authors see
that a direct comparison could be made between the complexity of ICT and the com-
plexity of genetics. Indeed, the concern that ‘average’ citizens might face a knowledge
deficit relating to genetics was taken seriously by the Personal Genome Project – a
US/Canadian genetics project employing open consent procedures. In the initial round
of recruitment, only those with at least a master’s degree in genetics were allowed to
consent to participate in the project (Lunshof et al. 2008).
yThey do begin by providing a generally applicable rule (although the threshold set by
this is absurdly low): ‘blanket consent without specifying the exact purpose of the pro-
cessing is not acceptable’ (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2011, p 17).
zHowever, it should be noted that consent under the Regulation fails if information in
only one category cannot be provided, or is not adequately specific.
aaArticle 14(b) in the Parliament’s version and Article 14(1)(b) in the Council’s ver-
sion. It should be pointed out that the Parliament’s version of Article 9(2)(a) specifically
includes the possibility to consent to ‘one or more specified purposes’ or processing.
However, as we explain in footnote 21, we do not see this as opening up a route to
broadening the scope of a single consent, but rather to allowing multiple, specific
consents to be given at one time. Open consent does not attempt to list multiple
specific uses.
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Council versions.
Article 83c(3) of the Council version should also be noted here. ‘Article 83c(3) states: By
derogation from points (b) and (e) of Article 5(1) and from Article 6(3a), processing of
personal data for scientific (…) purposes under the conditions referred to in paragraph 1
shall not be considered incompatible with the purpose for which the data are initially col-
lected and may be processed for those purposes for longer than necessary for the initial
purpose, provided that the controller implements appropriate safeguards for the rights
and freedoms of data subjects, in particular (…)’. The sentiments of Article 83c(3) mirror
those of Article 5(b) of the Council’s version which states that; ‘further processing of data
for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible sub-
ject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in Article 83. At first sight, this looks like
a possibility for biobanks to avoid specificity as long as they institute adequate safeguards.
However, the Article only applies to data whose initial collection was not for the purposes
of scientific research. Such data may then be repurposed for a secondary use in scientific
research provided adequate safeguards are in place. In biobanks operating open consent,
data are collected with the primary purpose being scientific research. The biobank is fully
aware, at the moment of collection, of the scope of research which may be conducted –
although they cannot be specific about what research exactly. There is no secondary
purpose. A biobank cannot thus rely on this Article to avoid the limitations of consent
provisions in the Regulation. There is however, irony in the fact that data collected with-
out the primary purpose being research, can be used for a much broader set of research
purposes than data initially collected for research with the data subject’s consent.
ccArticle 14(f) of the Parliament’s version and Article 14(1a)(c) of the Council’s version.
ddAt first sight, the issue raised by stating ‘researchers’ as ‘recipients’ seems very similar
to that raised by stating ‘research’ as ‘purpose’. Accordingly, a similar line of questioning
would seem relevant. However, there is a difference in the construction of the Articles
which deserves consideration. Article 14(1)(f) states that the data controller must list ‘the
recipients or the categories of recipients’ of the data. 14(1)(b) on the other hand, makes
no reference to the possibility to elaborate ‘categories’ of purpose. Unfortunately, it has
proven difficult to clarify the relevance of this difference. There is no clear indication as to
the purpose of the inclusion of the term ‘categories’ in relation to recipients of data. The
authors feel the most likely interpretation of the term is that it was inserted in order to
give some freedom from the narrow term ‘recipients’ which appears at the start of Article
14(b). If, ‘categories of recipient’, were not there, the data controller would always be
obliged to provide an exact list of all recipients, at the moment of consent – similar to the
strict construction we find in Article 14(g). Given that consent is a highly contextual con-
cept, the authors cannot imagine the benefit to be had from setting such a condition. An-
other interpretation of the term is possible. It could be interpreted as a qualification. The
term ‘categories of recipient’ allowing a looser degree of specificity in relation to informa-
tion on recipients in comparison with other categories of information in Article 14 (for
example purpose in 14(b)). If this interpretation is correct, it would suggest that the
Commission wanted to create a comparison of categories of information. The authors find
this idea unlikely.
eeArticle 14(g) of the Parliament’s version and Article 14(1a)(d) of the Council’s
version.
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such as lifestyle data, may be collected in order to aid research. Such lifestyle information
allows studies to be conducted that observe the interplay of genetics and environmental
factors – for example, gene X plays a role in condition A, but so may smoking: the
complete causes of condition A would thus require information on study participant smo-
king habits as well as their genetics.
ggAlthough each individual’s specific genetic make-up is unique, specific architectural
features will rarely be unique to one individual. Accordingly, if a feature of architecture
has significance, it can often be generalised to infer knowledge about others who may
be assumed to share that architecture (for example blood relatives – including ances-
tors and future progeny) but a number of other shared biological groups could be
imagined). Genetic data may thus also have relevance for successive generations.
hhThe ability of technological progression to invalidate claims made at a certain mo-
ment of time has been recognised in data protection law in relation to anonymous data.
The relation of technological progression to consent, however, remains unclear (Article
29 Data Protection Working Party 2007a).
iiIt has been pointed out that there may be the facility to exclude the applicability of
Article 14, for example, in Article 83c of the Council’s proposal on Chapter IX. However,
this Article only becomes relevant when data are processed on the basis of 9(2)(i) – pro-
cessing of sensitive data for scientific purposes – not when the processing of data is legiti-
mated under 9(2)(a) (consent). We have argued that we believe there is a lexical order to
grounds of legitimation and that 9(2)(a) should be relied upon. Further Article 83c(2)
states: ‘Where personal data are processed for scientific purposes, Member State law may,
subject to appropriate measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject,
provide for derogations from: (a) Article 14a(1) and (2) where and insofar as the provision
of such information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort.’ As
elaborated in footnote, 21, such legislation either does not currently exist or may be
inadequate and, if relied on, would perhaps be counterproductive as it may lead to a frag-
mentation of the legislative framework.
jjIt should be borne in mind that other actors may become involved later in the bio-
banking process – pharmaceuticals companies who want to create products on the back
of biobank materials, police forces who want to use biobank materials for crime detection
etc. However, these relationships raise issues in their own right and there may be the need
to provide legal protection against the harms that could come through the use of data by
third parties whose interests may indeed conflict with the donor’s. However, the authors
are sceptical that strict consent requirements in data protection law are the best place to
do this. In relation to police use of data, for example, strict consent will be no protection
at all. Statutory biobank secrecy provisions would be far better suited.Competing interests
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